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Abstract
We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019a) of the winner-
bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a complete
information environment, that even though these auctions are essentially equivalent for
the Nash equilibrium prediction, they can be expected to differ in fundamental ways
when they are operated. Besides the direct policy implications, two general conse-
quences follow. First, a mechanism designer who accounts for the empirical plausibility
of equilibria may not be constrained by Maskin invariance. Second, a mechanism de-
signer who does not account for the empirical plausibility of equilibria may inadvertently
design biased mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the plausibility of Nash equilibria of two popular auctions for the dis-
solution of a partnership. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis
(Velez and Brown, 2019a), we show that even though the Nash equilibria of the complete
information games that ensue when these mechanisms are operated are essentially identical,
these mechanisms can be expected to differ in fundamental ways. Two general conclusions
for the theory of full implementation follow. First, a mechanism designer who accounts
for empirical plausibility of equilibria may not be constrained by usual invariance proper-
ties. Second, a mechanism designer who does not account for the empirical plausibility of
equilibria may design biased mechanisms.
We consider a symmetric partnership dissolution problem in which two agents who
collectively own an object need to decide who receives the object when monetary compen-
sation, chosen out of a finite but fine greed, is possible. In the spirit of the implementation
literature with complete information (see Jackson, 2001, for a survey) we assume that an
arbitrator who makes a recommendation for this division knows that the agents know each
other well but does not know the agents’ preferences on the possible divisions.1 This is a
relevant benchmark for the dissolution of a marriage or a long standing partnership. We
assume that agents are expected utility maximizers with quasi-linear utility indices. For
concreteness, suppose that agents’ values for the object are vl ≤ vh. We study two promi-
nent mechanisms that we refer to as the extreme-price auctions (EPs). These mechanisms
operate as follows. First, the arbitrator asks the agents to bid for the object. Then assigns
the object to a higher bidder, breaking ties uniformly at random. The transfer from the
agent who receives the object to the other agent is determined as follows: the transfer is
the winner bid, the winner-bid auction (WB); the transfer is the loser bid, the loser-bid
auction (LB).2
Our first step to evaluate the performance of EPs is to characterize the Nash equilibrium
outcomes of the games that ensue when these mechanisms are operated. We consider both
pure and mixed strategy equilibria. When agents have equal types, both auctions give, in
1The assumption of complete information in our partnership dissolution problem allows us to contrast
empirical equilibrium analysis with the well-understood restrictions of Nash implementation in this en-
vironment. Our approach to implementation theory, and in general mechanism design, does not impose
restrictions on the information structure that the modeler believes is a reasonable description of reality.
For instance, one can define and study empirical equilibria in general incomplete information environments,
under a Bayesian information structure (Velez and Brown, 2019b).
2EPs belong to the family of α-auctions studied by Cramton et al. (1987) and McAfee (1992). Note that
the partnership dissolution environment differs substantially from a buyer-seller environment in which the
payoff of the loser of a first-price auction or a second-price auction does not depend on the price paid by the
winner.
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each Nash equilibrium, equal expected payoff to each agent (Lemma 1). When valuations
are different, the set of efficient Nash equilibrium payoffs of both auctions coincide (Propo-
sition 1).3 This common set can be placed in a one to one correspondence with the integers
{vl/2, ...., vh/2}: each equilibrium has a unique payoff-determinant bid in this set and for
each such integer there is an equilibrium with this payoff-determinant bid (Proposition 2).
We refer to this set as the Nash range. Between two elements of the Nash range, the higher
valuation agent prefers the left one (paying less), and the lower valuation agent prefers the
right one (being paid more).
Not all Nash equilibria are plausible to be observed, even approximately, when a game
takes place (c.f. van Damme, 1991). Thus, the equivalence of Nash equilibrium outcomes
for EPs may not be realistic. If one refines the Nash equilibria of EPs by ruling out
weakly dominated behavior, the associated equilibrium payoff-determinant bids collapse to
extreme singleton sets: {vl/2} for WB and {vh/2} for LB. Experiments show that the WB
exhibits a bias in favor of the higher valuation agent and the LB exhibits a bias in favor
of the lower valuation agent (Brown and Velez, 2019). However, observed biases are not
as extreme as those predicted by undominated equilibrium. Indeed, the best performance
of these auctions, when behavior of both types clearly separates, involves persistent weakly
dominated behavior (Sec. 6, Brown and Velez, 2019). This is consistent with the extensive
literature that shows weakly dominated behavior may be empirically plausible (see Velez
and Brown, 2019b, for a meta-analysis).
Thus, we are left with the question whether the bias observed in laboratory experiments
with these mechanisms should be expected in general. That is, is there any reason why
the weakly dominated behavior that sustains payoff-determinant bids close to vl/2 for WB
is more plausible than the weakly dominated behavior that sustains payoff-determinant
bids on the other extreme of the Nash range? Symmetrically, is there any reason why the
weakly dominated behavior that sustains payoff-determinant bids close to vh/2 for LB is
more plausible than the weakly dominated behavior that sustains payoff-determinant bids
on the other extreme of the Nash range?
The conventional wisdom on plausibility of equilibria does not offer any clue to an-
swer this question. Essentially, the equilibrium refinements in the literature, implicitly of
explicitly rule out all weakly dominated behavior (van Damme, 1991). Thus, to answer
this question we advance empirical equilibrium analysis of these auctions. This theory was
recently developed by Velez and Brown (2019a) to discriminate among weakly dominated
Nash equilibria of a normal form game based on their empirical plausibility.
3The maximal aggregate loss in an inefficient equilibrium is one unit. The analysis of inefficient equilibria
leads to the same conclusions we state here in the introduction for efficient equilibria (Sec. 4.2.1).
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Empirical equilibrium is the refinement of Nash equilibrium defined by means of the
following thought experiment. Consider an observable payoffs environment, as an economics
laboratory experiment, in which we observe payoffs and sample behavior. We imagine that
we model the unobservables that explain our observations. To fix ideas, think for instance
that we construct a randomly disturbed payoff model as in Harsanyi (1973).4 In order to
bring our model to accepted standards of science we need to make sure it is falsifiable.
We observe that in the most popular models for the analysis of experimental data this has
been done by requiring consistency with an a priori observable restriction for which there is
empirical support, weak payoff monotonicity.5 This property of the full profile of empirical
distributions of play in a game requires that for each agent, differences in behavior reveal
differences in expected utility. That is, between two alternative actions for an agent, say
a and b, if the agent plays a with higher frequency than b, it is because given what the
other agents are doing, a has higher expected utility than b. Finally, we proceed with
our study and define a refinement of Nash equilibrium by means of “approachability” by
behavior in our model a` la Harsanyi (1973), van Damme (1991), and McKelvey and Palfrey
(1996). That is, we label as implausible the Nash equilibria of our game that are not
the limit of a sequence of behavior that can be generated by our model. If our model is
well-specified, the equilibria that are ruled implausible by our refinement, will never be
approached by observable behavior even when distributions of play approach mutual best
responses.6 Of course, we are not sure what the true model is. Our thought experiment was
already fruitful, however. We learned that if we were able to construct the true model and
our a priori restriction does not hinder its specification, the Nash equilibria that we would
identify as implausible will necessarily contain those in the complement of the closure of
weakly payoff monotone behavior. This leads us to the definition of empirical equilibrium,
a Nash equilibrium for which there is a sequence of weakly payoff monotone distributions of
play converging to it. The complement of this refinement (in the Nash equilibrium set), the
empirically implausible equilibria, are the Nash equilibria that are determined implausible
by any theory that is disciplined by weak payoff monotonicity.
In our main results, we characterize the set of empirical equilibrium payoffs of EPs
4Other popular alternatives are the control cost model (van Damme, 1991), the monotone structural
QRE model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), and the regular QRE model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996;
Goeree et al., 2005).
5For instance, van Damme (1991) requires permutation invariance on Harsanyi (1973)’s models. This
induces weak payoff monotonicity. Control cost games, monotone structural QRE, and regular QRE also
satisfy this property. Regular QRE have been successful in fitting patterns of behavior in diverse strategic
environments (Goeree et al., 2016).
6We have in mind an unmodeled evolutionary process by which behavior approaches a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we are essentially interested in the situations in which eventually a game form is a good approximation
of the strategic situation we model, as when perturbations vanish in Harsanyi (1973)’s approachability theory.
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(Theorems 1 and 2). The highlights of these characterizations are the following. With a
single exception among all type profiles, these sets are disjoint. The empirical equilibrium
payoffs of WB belong to the left half of the Nash range. When vl is not too close to the
minimal bid, i.e., at least 3vh/8, the empirical equilibrium payoffs of WB essentially (up
to rounding) are the left fifth of the Nash range. Symmetrically, the empirical equilibrium
payoffs of LB belong to the right half of the Nash range. When vh is not too close to the
maximal bid, the empirical equilibrium payoffs of LB essentially are the right fifth of the
Nash range.
Thus, empirical equilibrium analysis reveals that the bias observed in experiments is
indeed a characteristic of EPs. Under the testable hypotheses that observable behavior is
weakly payoff monotone and that frequencies of play approach mutual best responses, the
WB necessarily benefits the higher valuation agent and the LB necessarily benefits the lower
valuation agent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 places our contribution in the
context of the literature. Sec. 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents our results, the
intuition behind them, and their general implications for the theory of full implementation.
Sec. 5 discusses the robustness of our results to violations of weak payoff monotonicity.
Sec. 6 concludes. We present all proofs in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
EPs are part of a family of mechanisms proposed for Cramton et al. (1987) for the dissolution
of a partnership. If ownership is symmetric, in an independent private values environment,
these mechanisms are efficient, individually rational, and incentive compatible. In a com-
plete information environment, EPs are strategically equivalent to a mechanism that elicits
agents valuations and then assigns an allocation in which no agent prefers the allotment of
any other agent to her own (see Velez, 2018, for a survey).
Our study shares some features with the literature on Nash implementation (Jackson,
2001), Bayesian implementation (Jackson, 1991), and undominated implementation (Palfrey
and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992). Similar to these studies, we evaluate the performance
of EPs based on the set of all equilibrium outcomes that cannot be ruled out when the
mechanisms are operated. An obvious difference is that our equilibrium refinement is a
compromise between these approaches. We acknowledge that not all Nash equilibria are
plausible. We do not go to the extreme to rule out all weakly dominated equilibria, an
easily falsified statement. At a technical level, our approach differs substantially with im-
plementation literature. First, we consider all Nash equilibria including equilibria in mixed
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strategies. Indeed, our work reveals that there is no reason to believe that a pure strategy
equilibrium is specially plausible (see Sec. 4.3). The pure strategy equilibria of EPs are
actually almost all wiped out by our empirical equilibrium refinement (recall that, in par-
ticular, this means that behavior in any weak payoff monotone randomly disturbed payoff
model of Harsanyi (1973) for these games cannot accumulate towards these equilibria as
perturbations vanish). Second, all of our results and general conclusions are drawn from
the analysis of intuitive mechanisms. By contrast, full implementation theory has concen-
trated on finding necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation based on canonical
mechanisms, which are unlikely to be deployed in applications.
Empirical equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium by means of approximation by behavior
that is observationally sub-optimal. In this sense our work can be related with the growing
literature on mechanism design with (as if) boundedly rational agents. These studies gener-
ally endorse a form of bounded rationality and aim at finding institutions that perform well
when operated on agents who exhibit these particular patterns of behavior (c.f., Anderson
et al., 1998, 2001; Eliaz, 2002; Cabrales and Serrano, 2012; Tumennasan, 2013; de Clippel,
2014; de Clippel et al., 2017; Kneeland, 2017). Empirical equilibrium analysis does not give
up the regularity induced by expected utility maximization. It puts a reality check on it
by requiring proximity by plausible boundedly rational behavior. Alternatively, one can
think of our analysis as the study of boundedly rational behavior when it is disciplined by
proximity to a Nash equilibrium. The studies that are closest to ours consider forms of
implementation that like empirical equilibrium are determined by convergence processes:
Anderson et al. (1998, 2001) study limit behavior of logistic QRE models in all-pay auctions
and minimum contribution games; Cabrales and Serrano (2012) study implementation in
the limits of some evolutionary processes; and Tumennasan (2013) studies implementation
in the limits of logistic equilibria for increasingly sophisticated logistic quantal response
functions. Anderson et al. (1998, 2001)’s approach is limited to the parametric logistic
form and intensively uses the structure of the games it analyses in order to characterize
logistic equilibria by means of tractable differential equations.7 Both Cabrales and Serrano
(2012) and Tumennasan (2013) concentrate only on pure strategy equilibria and require
strong conditions be satisfied for convergence, which limit the applicability of their results
to general games. In particular, their implementation results require games to have strict
equilibria, which essentially implies invariance under Maskin monotonic transformations.
Finally, this paper makes part of a research agenda that reevaluates the applications of
game theory based on the empirical equilibrium refinement. In Velez and Brown (2019a)
7The set of empirical equilibria may differ from the set of Nash equilibria that are limits of logistic
equilibria (Velez and Brown, 2019c).
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we define and study the foundations of empirical equilibrium. In Velez and Brown (2019b)
we advance empirical equilibrium analysis of strategy-proof mechanisms. In a companion
paper, Brown and Velez (2019), we experimentally evaluate the predictions of empirical
equilibrium for EPs. In experiments with different valuation structures these auctions
exhibit the bias predicted by empirical equilibrium analysis. The data also supports the
positive associated of bids and their expected utility.
3 Model
There are two agents N ≡ {1, 2} who collectively own an object (indivisible good) and
need to allocate it to one of them. Monetary compensation is possible. Each agent’s payoff
type is characterized by the value that he or she assigns to the object. We assume these
type spaces are Θ1 = Θ2 ≡ {v, v + 2, ..., v}, where v ≤ v are even positive integers.
8 The
generic type of agent i is vi ∈ Θi. Let Θ ≡ Θ1 ×Θ2 with generic element v ≡ (v1, v2). The
lower and higher values at v are vl and vh respectively. We also assume that agents are
expected utility maximizers. The expected utility index of agent i with type vi is vi − p if
receiving the object and paying p to the other agent; p if being paid this amount by the
other agent and receiving no object. Whenever we make statements in which the identity
of the agents is not relevant, we conveniently use neutral notation i and −i. The set of
possible allocations is that in which an agent receives the object and transfers an amount
p ∈ {0, 1, ..., p} with p ≥ v/2, to the other agent. Let A be the space of these allocations.
For an allocation a ∈ A the value of agent i’s utility index at the allotment assigned by a
to this agent is ui(a|vi).
A social choice correspondence (scc) selects a set of allocations for each possible profile
of types. The generic scc is G : Θ⇒ A.
A mechanism is a pair (M,ϕ) whereM ≡ (Mi)i∈N is an unrestricted message space and
ϕ :M → ∆(A) is an outcome function. The following are the two mechanisms we analyze.
Definition 1. The winner-bid auction is the mechanism in which each agent selects a bid
in the set {0, 1, 2, ..., p}. An agent with the highest bid receives the object. Ties are resolved
uniformly at random. The agent who receives the object pays the winner bid to the other
agent. The loser-bid auction is the mechanism defined similarly where the payment is the
loser bid. We refer to these two auctions as the extreme-price auctions.
Given a profile of types v ∈ Θ, mechanism (M,ϕ) determines a complete information
game Γ ≡ (M,ϕ, v). A (mixed) strategy for agent i is a probability measure on Mi.
8We assume positive even valuations in order to simplify notation and to avoid the analysis of trivial
cases that do not add to the general message of our results.
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Agent i’s generic strategy is σi ∈ ∆(Mi). The profile of strategies is σ ≡ (σi)i∈N . A pure
strategy places probability one in a given action. We associate pure strategies with actions
themselves. The expected utility of agent i with type vi in Γ from selecting action mi when
the other agent selects an action as prescribed by σ−i is
Uϕ(mi|σ−i; vi) ≡
∑
m−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mi,m−i)|vi)σ−i(m−i).
A profile of strategies σ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ if for each i ∈ N , each mi in the
support of σi, and eachm
′
i ∈Mi, Uϕ(m
′
i|σ−i; vi) ≤ Uϕ(mi|σ−i; vi). The set of Nash equilibria
of Γ is N(Γ). The set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of Γ are those obtained with positive
probability for some Nash equilibrium of Γ. Agent i’s expected payoff in equilibrium σ is
pii(σ).
Definition 2 (Velez and Brown, 2019a). σ ≡ (σi)i∈N is weakly payoff monotone for
(M,ϕ, v) if for each i ∈ N and each pair {mi, ni} ⊆ Mi, σi(mi) > σi(ni) implies that
Uϕ(mi|σ−i; vi) > Uϕ(ni|σ−i; vi).
Definition 3 (Velez and Brown, 2019a). σ ∈ N(Γ) is an empirical equilibrium of Γ if there
is a sequence of weakly payoff monotone distributions of Γ, {σλ}λ∈N, such that as λ→∞,
σλ → σ.
4 Results
4.1 Extreme-price auctions and Nash equilibrium
We start by characterizing the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the games induced by the
EPs.
The theory of fair allocation has produced a series of principles that an arbitrator may
want to adhere to when resolving a partnership dissolution dispute (see Thomson, 2010, for
a survey). Two of the most popular are the following: efficiency, i.e., a party who values
the object the most should receive it; equity, i.e., no party should prefer the allotment
of the other (Foley, 1967). Abstracting from incentives issues imagine that the arbitrator
knows the agents’ valuations, v ∈ Θ. It is easy to see that if the arbitrator abides by the
principles of efficiency and equity, agents’ payoffs should have the form:9 vl/2 + t for l and
vh/2+ (|vh/2− vl/2|− t) for h, where 0 ≤ t ≤ |vh/2− vl/2|. In other words, if an arbitrator
endorses these two principles, the only that is left for him or her is to determine a division
9In our environment no-envy implies efficiency for deterministic allocations (Svensson, 1983). Our state-
ment here refers also to random assignments.
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between the agents of the “equity surplus,” i.e., ES(v) ≡ |vh/2 − vl/2| (Tadenuma and
Thomson, 1995b).
The following lemma states that each extreme-price auction achieves, in each Nash
equilibrium, the objectives of efficiency and equity when agents have equal valuations. We
omit the straightforward proof.
Lemma 1. Let (M,ϕ) be an extreme-price auction and v ∈ Θ such that v1 = v2. Then
for each σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v), pi1(σ) = pi2(σ) = v1/2 = v2/2. Moreover, for each deterministic
allocation a ∈ A in which each agent receives this common payoff, there is a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) whose outcome is this allocation.
The following proposition states that each extreme-price auction essentially achieves,
in each Nash equilibrium, the objectives of efficiency and equity for arbitrary valuation
profiles.
Proposition 1. Let (M,ϕ) be an extreme-price auction and v ∈ Θ such that vl < vh.
Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v). Then, there is p ∈ {vl/2, ..., vh/2} such that the
support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p} and the support of σh belongs to {p, ..., p}. If σ is efficient,
the higher value agent receives the object and pays p to the other agent. Moreover,
1. If (M,ϕ) is the winner-bid auction, then p is in the support of σh. If σ is inefficient,
i.e., σl(p) > 0, then p = vl/2; pil(σ) + pih(σ) ≥ vh − 1; and pih(σ) ≥ vh/2 +ES(v)− 1.
2. If (M,ϕ) is the loser-bid auction, then p is in the support of σl. If σ is inefficient, i.e.,
σh(p) > 0, then p = vm/2; pil(σ) + pih(σ) ≥ vh − 1; and pil(σ) ≥ vl/2 + ES(v) − 1.
Proposition 1 reveals that the Nash equilibria of the extreme-price auctions have a
simple structure. In all equilibria, the payoff-determinant bid is in the set {vl/2, ..., vh/2}.
Let us refer to this set of bids as the Nash range. In most of these equilibria agents bids
are strictly separated. That is, there is a bid p in the Nash range such that one agent
bids weakly on one side of p and the other agent bids strictly on the other side of p. In
these equilibria, which are strictly separated, outcomes are efficient and equitable. There
are inefficient equilibria. For the winner-bid auction, it is possible that both agents bid
vl/2. For the loser-bid auction it is possible that both agents bid vh/2. In both cases the
aggregate welfare loss is at most one unit, i.e., the size of the minimal difference between
bids. This means that if the minimal bid increment is one cent, the maximum that these
auctions can lose in aggregate expected utility for any Nash equilibrium is one cent. Thus,
one can say that these auctions essentially implement the principles of efficiency and equity
in Nash equilibria.10
10Our proof of Proposition 1 also reveals that the probability of an inefficient outcome is bounded above
by the inverse of the equity surplus, measured in the minimal bid increment.
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Proposition 1 allows us to easily characterize Nash equilibrium payoffs for extreme-price
auctions.
Proposition 2. Let (M,ϕ) be an extreme-price auction and v ∈ Θ such that vl < vh.
1. The set of efficient Nash equilibrium payoffs of (M,ϕ, v), i.e.,
{(pil(σ), pih(σ)) : σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v), pil(σ) + pih(σ) = vh}, is the set of integer divisions of
the equity-surplus, i.e., {(vl/2 + ES(v) − t, vh/2 + t) : t ∈ {0, 1, ..., ES(v)}}.
2. The set of inefficient Nash equilibrium payoffs of the winner-bid auction is {(vl/2, vh/2+
ES(v) − ε) : ε ∈ (0, 1]}.
3. The set of inefficient Nash equilibrium payoffs of the loser-bid auction is {(vl/2 +
ES(v) − ε, vh/2) : ε ∈ (0, 1]}.
4.2 Empirical equilibrium
4.2.1 Empirical equilibrium payoffs
We characterize the set of empirical equilibrium payoffs of the extreme-price auctions. Re-
call that by Lemma 1, when valuations are equal, the payoff of each agent is the same in
each Nash equilibrium of each extreme-price auction. Thus, we only need to character-
ize the payoffs of empirical equilibria when agents’ valuations differ. Since Proposition 2
characterizes Nash equilibrium payoffs for these auctions, it is convenient to describe em-
pirical equilibrium payoffs by the set of conditions for which a Nash equilibrium payoff is
an empirical equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 1. Let (M,ϕ) be the winner-bid auction, v ∈ Θ such that vl < vh, and σ ∈
N(M,ϕ, v). If σ is efficient, pi(σ) is the payoff of an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) if
and only if
1. pih(σ) = vh/2 + ES(v) when ES(v) = 1, or ES(v) = 2 and vl > 2;
2. pih(σ) ≥ vh/2 + ES(v)/2 + vl/4 − 1/2 when ES(v) > 1 and vl ≤ 3vh/8;
3. pih(σ) ≥ vh/2 + 4ES(v)/5− 4/5 when ES(v) > 2, vl > 3vh/8, and vl < 7vh/12− 7/6;
4. pih(σ) > vh/2 + 4ES(v)/5− 4/5 when ES(v) > 2, vl > 3vh/8, and vl ≥ 7vh/12− 7/6.
If σ is inefficient, pi(σ) is the payoff of an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) except when
ES(v) = 1 and pih(σ) < vh/2 + 1/2.
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Theorem 1 reveals a surprising characteristic of the empircal equilibria of the winner-bid
auction. For simplicity fix vh at a certain value. Let vl ≤ vh. When vl is low, i.e., at most
3vh/8, the minimal share of the equity surplus that the higher value agent obtains in an
empirical equilibrium is, essentially, at least 50% of the equity surplus (since we assumed
vl is a positive even number, the exact share depends on rounding, but is never less than
50%). More precisely, for this range of vl, agent h receives a payoff that is at least
vh/2 + ES(v)/2 + vl/4− 1/2 = vh/2 + vh/4− 1/2.
This means that p is the winner bid in an empirical equilibrium of the winner-bid auction
for such valuations if and only if p ≤ vh/4 + 1/2 (Fig. 1). Thus, while the maximal bid
in an empirical equilibrium is the same for all valuations when vl ≤ 3vh/8, the minimal
percentage of the equity surplus that is assigned to the higher value agent increases from
essentially 50% when vl = 2 to essentially 80% when vl = 3vh/8. For higher values of vl,
i.e., 3vh/8 < vl < vh, the higher value agent receives, essentially, at least 80% of the equity
surplus (Fig. 1).
In summary, Theorem 1 states that the minimal share of the equity surplus that the
higher value agent obtains in an empirical equilibrium of the winner-bid auction depends
on the number of possible bids that are to the left of the Nash range. In the extreme case in
which there is only one bid to the left of the Nash range, the higher value agent essentially
obtains at least 50% of the equity surplus. As the number of bids to the left of the Nash
range increases, the minimal share of the equity surplus that is obtained by the higher
value agent in an empirical equilibrium increases until it reaches essentially 80% when the
number of possible bids to the left of the Nash range is 60% of the number of bids in the
Nash range (equivalently, vl ≤ 3vh/8). When the number of possible bids to the left of
the Nash range is higher than 60% of the number of bids in the Nash range (equivalently,
vl > 3vh/8), the minimal share of the equity surplus that is obtained by the higher value
agent in an empirical equilibrium remains essentially 80%. (For low values of the equity
surplus, rounding has a significant effect; see Fig. 1).
Theorem 2. Let (M,ϕ) be the loser-bid auction, v ∈ Θ such that vl < vh, and σ ∈
N(M,ϕ, v). If σ is efficient, pi(σ) is the payoff of an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) if
and only if
1. pil(σ) ≥ vl/2 + ES(v) if ES(v) = 1, or ES(v) = 2 and vh < p− 1;
2. pil(σ) ≥ vl/2 + ES(v)/2 + (p − vh/2)/2 − 1/2 if ES(v) > 1 and vh/2 ≥ vl/2 + 5(p −
vl/2)/8.
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3. pil(σ) ≥ vl/2 + 4ES(v)/5 − 4/5 if ES(v) > 2, vh/2 < vl/2 + 5(p − vl/2)/8, and
vh/2 > p− 7(p − vl/2)/24 − 7/12;
4. pil(σ) > vl/2 + 4ES(v)/5 − 4/5 if ES(v) > 2, vh/2 < vl/2 + 5(p − vl/2)/8, and
vh/2 ≤ p− 7(p − vl/2)/24 − 7/12.
If pi is inefficient, pi is the payoff of an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) except when
ES(v) = 1 and pil(σ) < vl/2 + 1/2.
The empirical equilibrium payoffs of the loser-bid auction are symmetric to those of the
winner-bid auction. The minimal share of the equity surplus that the lower value agent
obtains in an empirical equilibrium of the winner-bid auction depends on the number of
possible bids that are to the right of the Nash range. In the extreme case in which there is
only one bid to the right of the Nash range, the lower value agent essentially obtains at least
50% of the equity surplus. As the number of bids to the right of the Nash range increases,
the minimal share of the equity surplus that is obtained by the lower value agent in an
empirical equilibrium increases until it reaches essentially 80% when the number of possible
bids to the right of the Nash range is 60% of the number of bids in the Nash range. When
the number of possible bids to the right of the Nash range is higher than 60% of the number
of bids in the Nash range, the minimal share of the equity surplus that is obtained by the
lower value agent in an empirical equilibrium remains essentially 80%. (For low values of
the equity surplus, rounding has a significant effect; see Fig. 1).
4.2.2 The intuition
The characterization of empirical equilibrium payoffs of the extreme-price auctions reveals
that empirical equilibrium makes a delicate selection of Nash equilibria, which is sensitive
to the global structure of the game. An empirical equilibrium may involve an agent playing
a weakly dominated strategy. However, not all Nash equilibria, in particular not all Nash
equilibria in which an agent plays a weakly dominated strategy, are empirical equilibria.
Thus, empirical equilibrium somehow discriminates among actions by assessing how likely
they can be played based on how they compare with the other actions. A discussion of the
proof of Theorem 1 informs us about this feature of empirical equilibrium.
Let v ∈ Θ be such that vl < vh. Let (M,ϕ) be the winner-bid auction and consider
σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v). By Proposition 1 this equilibrium is characterized by a winner bid p ∈
{vl/2, ..., vh/2}. Suppose that p > vl/2 and let t ≡ p− 1− vl/2. Suppose for simplicity that
t ≥ 1. One can easily see that agent l always regrets wining the auction when bidding p−1.
Indeed, bidding p−1 is weakly dominated for agent l by each bid in {vl/2−1, vl/2, ..., p−2}.
Let σλ be any monotone quantal response equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v). It follows that for each
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Figure 1: Payoff determinant bids in an empirical equilibrium of the extreme-price auctions.
For a given v ∈ Θ such that vl < vh, the Nash range is the set {vl/2, ..., vh/2}. In this graph we show, for
a fixed vh, the Nash range for each 2 < vl < vh and the bids that are winning bids for empirical equilibria
of the winner-bid and loser-bid auction. In the vertical line we measure vl/2 and in the horizontal line we
measure bids. For vl = 2, the Nash range is the set {1, 2, ..., vh/2}. In the graph this set is represented
by the points (1, 1), (2, 1),...,(vh/2, 1) (black dots). In general, for vl, we represent the Nash range, i.e.,
{vl/2, ..., vh/2} by the set of points (vl/2, vl/2),...,(vh/2, vl/2). We represent the winner bids in an empirical
equilibrium of the winner-bid auction for a given v ∈ Θ by triangles. We represent the winner bids in an
empirical equilibrium of the loser’s-bid auction for a given v ∈ Θ such that vl/2 = p − vh/2 by squares.
Notice that this choice of variable p as vl increases guarantees symmetry, i.e., there is the same number of
possible bids on each side of the Nash range, and is chosen for easier interpretation of the graph.
b ∈ {vl/2 − 1, vl/2, ..., p − 2}, Uϕ(b|σ
λ
h ; vl) ≥ Uϕ(p− 1|σ
λ
h ; vl). This means that there are
always at least t+ 2 bids that are at least as good as p− 1 for agent l. This imposes a cap
on the probability that this agent can place on p− 1. More precisely,
σλl (p− 1) ≤ 1/(t + 2). (1)
Thus, if σ is an empirical equilibrium, by (1), σl(p− 1) needs to be the limit of a sequence
of probabilities bounded above by 1/(t+ 2) and thus,
σl(p− 1) ≤ 1/(t+ 2). (2)
Now, in order for σ to be a Nash equilibrium it has to be the case that agent h has no
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incentive to bid one unit less than p. This is simply,
vh − p ≥ σl(p− 1)
[
1
2
(vh − (p− 1)) +
1
2
(p− 1)
]
+ (1− σl(p− 1))(vh − (p − 1)).
Equivalently, σl(p− 1) ≥ 1/(vh/2− p+ 1). Together with (2) this implies that p ≤ (vl/2 +
vh/2)/2, or equivalently
pih(σ) ≥ vh/2 + ES(v)/2.
Thus, the reason why empirical equilibrium predicts agent h gets at least half of the equity
surplus for any possible valuation is that it is not plausible that agent l will consistently
bid above half of the Nash range. These high bids are worse than too many bids to their
left for agent l. If this agent’s actions are monotone with respect to utility, the maximum
probability that he or she will end up placing in a bid on the right half of the Nash range
will never be enough to contain the propensity of agent h to lower his or her bid.
When there is more than one bid to the left of the Nash range, the analysis becomes
subtler. Let y ≡ vl/2−3t. The key to complete this analysis is to prove that in any quantal
response equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) that is close to σ, all bids b ∈ {max{0, y}, ..., p − 1} are
weakly better than p − 1 for agent l. The subtlety here lies in that this is not implied
directly by a weak domination relation as in our analysis above. In order to uncover this we
need to recursively obtain estimates of agent h’s distribution of play, which in turn depend
on agent l’s distribution of play.
Remarkably, we prove that the set of restrictions that we uncover by means of our anal-
ysis are the only ones that need to be satisfied by an empirical equilibrium payoff. Goeree
et al. (2005) characterize the set of regular QRE of an asymmetric matching pennies game.
At a conceptual level, this exercise is similar to the construction of empirical equilibria.
However, the techniques developed by Goeree et al. (2005) are useful only in two-by-two
games, where an agent’s distribution of play is described by a single real number. Thus,
there is virtually no precedent in the construction of empirical equilibria that are not strict
Nash equilibria for games with non-trivial action spaces. We do so as follows. First, we
identify for each target payoff an appropriate Nash equilibrium that produces it, say σ.
Then we take a convex combination of a perturbation of σ and a logistic quantal response.
This defines a continuous operator whose fixed points are the basis of our construction. In
a two-limit process we first get close enough to σ by placing a weight on it that is high
enough so the fixed points of the convex combination operators inherit some key properties
of σ. Then we allow the logistic response to converge to a best response and along this path
of convergence we obtain interior distributions that are close to σ and are payoff-monotone.
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4.3 Empirical equilibrium analysis and full implementation theory
Full implementation theory is the application of game theory in which one designs mech-
anisms based on their worst-case scenario performance. More precisely, given an scc and
a prediction for the interaction of agents in strategic situations, the designer looks for a
mechanism that obtains outcomes selected by the scc for the true profile of types for all the
predicted outcomes of the game that ensues when the mechanism is operated. When this
exercise is done based on the Nash equilibrium prediction, the mechanism designer finds
that many a desirable social objective is beyond her reach (Maskin, 1999; Jackson, 1991).
By contrast, most of the constraints of the mechanism designer are lifted if the worst-case
scenario discards all Nash equilibria that involve weakly dominated behavior (Palfrey and
Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992).
Since there are Nash equilibria that are intuitively implausible, designing for a worst-
case scenario accounting for all possible Nash equilibria is unnecessarily pessimistic. On
the other extreme, ruling out all weakly dominated behavior, a statement easily falsified, is
also unrealistically optimistic. Our partnership dissolution problem epitomizes this conflict
and clearly shows how empirical equilibrium analysis resolves it.
One can envision an arbitrator having a deliberate choice on the division of the equity
surplus in a partnership dissolution problem. For instance the arbitrator may want to
guarantee a minimum share of the equity surplus to a given agent. Proposition 2 implies
that this is not achieved by the extreme-price auctions if one evaluates them with the Nash
equilibrium prediction. The following lemma states that this is a feature not only of these
auctions but also of any mechanism that possesses equitable equilibria with deterministic
outcomes when agents’ valuations are equal.
Lemma 2. Let (M,ϕ) be an arbitrary mechanism. Suppose that for each v ∈ Θ such that
v1 = v2 and each allocation a ∈ A at which each agent gets payoff v1/2 = v2/2, there is
a Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) that obtains allocation a with certainty. Then, for each
v ∈ Θ and each t ∈ {0, 1, ..., ES(v)} there is σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v) such that pi1(σ) = v1/2+ t and
pi2(σ) = v2/2 + ES(v)− t.
Lemma 2 essentially states that if an arbitrator selects a mechanism that obtains with
certainty, in Nash equilibria, efficiency and equity whenever agents valuations coincide,
then any integer division of the equity surplus is an outcome of a Nash equilibrium when
valuations are different. The intuition why this is so is the following. If an allocation is an
outcome of a Nash equilibrium of a mechanism, this allocation must be the best each agent
can achieve given some reports of the other agents; if an agent’s utility changes weakly
enlarging the lower contour set of the agent at the equilibrium outcome, then the initial
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action profile must be also a Nash equilibrium for the second utility profile. One can easily
see that this property of the Nash equilibrium outcome correspondence of a mechanism,
popularly known as invariance under Maskin monotonic transformations (Maskin, 1999),
is responsible for the “contamination” result stated in the lemma.11
It is worth noting that Lemma 2 can be generalized to state that if a mechanism obtains
efficient and equitable equilibria with certainty when valuations are similar, then it has
to obtain a wide range of equity surplus distributions when valuations differ for a wider
margin. Thus, one can say that Nash equilibrium predicts that a social planner who wants
to obtain equity in most problems, needs to give up the possibility to target specific divisions
in problems in which there is a meaningful difference among equitable allocations. By
contrast, if the mechanism designer rules out all weakly dominated behavior, the EPs are
predicted to implement the extremes of the Nash range.
A social planner who accounts for the empirical plausibility of equilibria, realizes that
some social goals, which would be ruled out impossible by the full Nash implementation
analysis, are within his or her reach. For instance, using LB could be sensible for a social
planner who is able to exercise some level of affirmative action and chooses to benefit a
segment of the population who are likely to have lower valuations for the objects to be
assigned. Thus, intuitively the empirical equilibrium correspondence is not constrained by
invariance under Maskin monotonic transformations.
It is not accurate to simply say that the empirical equilibrium correspondence violates
this property, however. Invariance under Maskin monotonic transformations is a property
of pure strategy equilibrium correspondences that is usually defined only in ordinal envi-
ronments. Empirical equilibria may be in mixed strategies. Moreover, the pure-strategy
deterministic-outcome empirical equilibrium correspondence may not be well-defined.
Remark 1. Let (M,ϕ) be an extreme price auction and v ∈ Θ. If vl = vh, no empirical
equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) has a deterministic outcome.
Thus in order to make a formal statement we need to allow for random outcomes of an scc
and accordingly extend the notion of invariance under Maskin monotonic transformations.
Definition 4. For each a ∈ A and {v,w} ⊆ Θ, w is a Maskin monotonic transformation
of v at a if wi ≥ vi when agent i receives the object at a and wi ≤ vi otherwise. Let
f : Θ ⇒ ∆(A). Then, f is invariant under Maskin monotonic transformations if for each
v ∈ Θ, each a ∈ A such that δa ∈ f(v), and each Maskin monotonic transformation of v at
a, say w ∈ Θ, we have that δa ∈ f(w).
11Tadenuma and Thomson (1995a) were the first to apply this type of argument to the equitable allocation
of an object among n agents when monetary compensation is possible.
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Consider, for instance, v ∈ Θ such that vl < vh and an efficient equilibrium of an
extreme-price auction for v, say σ. By Proposition 1 this equilibrium is characterized by a
payoff-determinant bid in the Nash range p ∈ {vl/2, ..., vh/2}. Indeed when σ is efficient,
agent h receives the object and pays p to the other agent with certainty. One can prove that
the Nash equilibrium outcome correspondence of the extreme-price auctions are invariant
under Maskin monotonic transformations.12 An obvious implication of this property is that
if p is in the Nash range for valuations v, it is also in the Nash range for valuations (wl, vh)
where wl ≤ vl. This can be evaluated in Fig. 1 for the winner-bid auction, by simply checking
that if p is a payoff-determinant bid for some profile, it must be a payoff-determinant bid
when vl decreases.
13 Notice then that the empirical equilibrium correspondence of the
winner-bid auction is not invariant under Maskin monotonic transformations: There are
triangles in Fig. 1 that have no triangle below them. A symmetric argument can be done
for the loser-bid auction.
Remark 2. Let (M,ϕ) be an extreme-price auction. The correspondence
θ ∈ Θ 7→ {ϕ(σ) ∈ ∆(A) : σ is an empirical equilibrim of (M,ϕ, v)}, is not invariant un-
der Maskin monotonic transformations.
Two additional observations are worth noting. First, for a best-case mechanism designer,
who bases his or her analysis on partial implementation theory, empirical equilibrium anal-
ysis brings some obvious challenges that are beyond the scope of this paper. Velez and
Brown (2019b) report good news for the best-case robust mechanism designer, however.
Second, empirical equilibrium analysis also allows us to conclude that it is not without
loss of generality to restrict our attention to pure-strategy equilibria when a mechanism is
operated.
Remark 3. Let v ∈ Θ such that vl < vh. The only pure-strategy empirical equilibrium
of the winner-bid auction for v is σl = δvl/2−1 and σh ≡ δvl/2. The only pure-strategy
empirical equilibrium of the loser-bid auction for v is σl = δvh/2 and σh ≡ δvh/2+1.
Jackson (1992) constructed examples in which including arguably plausible mixed-
strategy equilibria in a worst-case scenario analysis would reverse the conclusions one ob-
tains by only analyzing pure-strategy equilibria. Empirical equilibrium analysis goes beyond
these observations and provides a clear framework in which plausibility is built into the pre-
diction of agents’ behavior. It is fair to say then that while empirical mechanism design
12Our definition of invariance under Maskin monotonic transformations imposes invariance restrictions
for equilibria in mixed strategies that generate a deterministic outcome. For this reason our statement here
requires a proof, which can be completed along the lines of Lemma 2.
13Fig. 1 illustrates empirical equilibrium payoffs for models with different p. For the winner-bid auction,
the equilibria that sustain the payoff determinant bids shown in the figure are available in all these models.
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opens new possibilities in the design of economic institutions, it also sets the standards
of analysis high by forcing us to consider mixed-strategy equilibria. In this context, our
complete characterization of empirical equilibria of extreme-price auctions in Theorems 1
and 2, and the characterization results in Velez and Brown (2019b), show that the technical
challenges can be resolved in policy relevant environments.
5 Discussion
Our analysis of mechanism based on empirical equilibrium has some challenges that are
shared by the analysis of mechanisms based on any solution concept that is not single-
valued for each game. If a Nash equilibrium is not empirical, we learn that it is implausible
(under our hypothesis of weak payoff monotonicity). By contrast, if a Nash equilibrium is
empirical, we do not know whether the equilibrium will be actually relevant in a particular
environment.
In some applications this may not be a problem. For instance, the main conclusion from
our analysis of empirical equilibria of EPs survives even if some empirical equilibria end up
not being relevant for these auctions. More precisely, the bias predicted for these mecha-
nisms will be present even when not all empirical equilibria end up being relevant when they
are operated. In general, many a social objective is guaranteed to be achieved whenever all
empirical equilibrium outcomes that result when a mechanism is operated satisfy it. Think,
for instance, of Pareto efficiency. Suppose that a mechanism guarantees this property for
each empirical equilibrium. This means that as long as behavior is payoff monotone and
approximates mutual best responses, this behavior will obtain Pareto efficiency with high
probability. Again, notice that in order to conclude this, it is not necessary to know which
empirical equilibria will actually be relevant when the mechanism is operated.
Designing based on empirical equilibrium also implicitly assumes that behavior when
the mechanism is operated will approximate a Nash equilibrium. On the one hand, though
not universally observed, there is evidence that frequencies of play in many games move
towards best responses. For instance, it is common that logistic QRE parameter estimates
increase toward best responses when estimated in experiments that are run in multiple
periods without repeated game effects (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). On the other hand,
one can also see our analysis of mechanisms based on empirical equilibrium as a departure
from the Nash equilibrium based analysis that makes it more realistic without losing the
regularity and power provided by the assumption that individual incentives are eventually
in equilibrium.
Finally, not all empirical evidence supports the assumption of weak payoff monotonicity.
18
Velez and Brown (2019b) documented violations of this property in the second price auction
experiments of Andreoni et al. (2007) and the pivotal mechanism experiment of Cason et al.
(2006). In our partnership dissolution environment there is a positive association between
the empirical expected payoff of an action and the probability with which it is chosen (Brown
and Velez, 2019). Rounding bids to multiples of five, a behavioral regularity observed in
these games, can easily induce violations of payoff monotonicity, however.
Thus, we should see weak payoff monotonicity as a regular expression of the positive
association between choice and expected utility in a game. We should not see this property
as a bullet proof characterization of behavior in games. Consistently, we should verify
whether the conclusions we obtained from our analysis survive for continuous variations of
it for which there is more empirical support. The following parametric form of the axiom
allows us to do this.
Definition 5. Let m ∈ [0, 1]. A profile of strategies σ ≡ (σi)i∈N is m-weakly pay-
off monotone for Γ if for each i ∈ N and each pair of actions {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai such that
Ui(σ−i, ai) ≥ Ui(σ−i, aˆi), we have that σi(ai) ≥ mσi(aˆi).
For m = 1 the property exactly corresponds to weak payoff monotonicity. For m > n,
m-weak payoff monotonicity implies n-weak payoff monotonicity. For m = 0 the property
imposes no restrictions in data.
Definition 6. Let m > 0. An m-empirical equilibrium of Γ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ that
is the limit of a sequence of m-weakly payoff monotone strategies for Γ.
One can prove that for any m > 0, them-empirical equilibrium outcome correspondence
violates invariance under Maskin monotonic transformations. Moreover, for values of m
close enough to one, the m-empirical equilibria of WB and LB are separated on the left half
and the right half of the Nash range. It is an interesting open question to determine the
lowest m for which this is so.
6 Conclussion
We advanced empirical equilibrium analysis of EPs. Our results reveal that as long as
empirical distributions of play in the games induced by these mechanisms are weakly payoff
monotone, they can approximate mutual best responses only if they exhibit a form of bias.
The WB favors the higher valuation agent and the LB favors the lower valuation agent.
Our analysis also brings news to the abstract mechanism design paradigm. First, we
learn that an arbitrator can abide by a principle of equity and at the same time exercise a
form of affirmative action that guarantees a special treatment for either low or high value
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agents. Technically, this proves that a mechanism designer who accounts for empirical plau-
sibility of equilibria is not constrained by invariance to Maskin monotonic transformations.
Second, and not less important, we learn that an arbitrator who uses an EPA within a legal
system in which this type of affirmative action is forbidden, can be subject to a legitimate
challenge supported by theory and empirical data. Indeed, our results produce a series of
comparative statics that are supported by experimental evidence (see our companion pa-
per, Brown and Velez, 2019). All in all, a mechanism designer who does not account for
empirical plausibility of equilibria may be both overly cautious and leave unexplored some
possibilities for design and also may inadvertently design biased mechanisms.
7 Appendix
For x ∈ R, ⌊x⌋ denotes the floor of x, i.e., the greatest integer that is less than or equal to
x; ⌈x⌉ denotes the ceiling of x, i.e., the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to x.
Definition 7. σ ≡ (σi)i∈N is payoff monotone for (M,ϕ, v) if for each i ∈ N and each pair
{mi, ni} ⊆Mi, Uϕ(mi|σ−i; vi) ≥ Uϕ(ni|σ−i; vi) if and only if σi(mi) ≥ σi(ni).
The following theorem is useful in our characterization of empirical equilibria of EPs.
Theorem 3 (Velez and Brown, 2019a). Let (M,ϕ) be a EPA and v ∈ Θ. Then, σ is an
empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) and it
is the limit of interior payoff monotone distributions for (M,ϕ, v).
The logistic quantal response function with parameter λ ≥ 0, denoted by lλ, assigns to
each mi ∈Mi and each x ∈ R
Mi the value,
lλimi(x) ≡
eλxmi∑
ni∈Mi
eλxni
. (3)
It can be easily checked that for each λ > 0, the corresponding logistic quantal response
function is continuous and monotone, i.e., for each x ∈ RMi and each pair {m, t} ⊆ Mi,
xm ≥ xt if and only if l
λ
im(x) ≥ l
λ
it(x).
Proof of Proposition 1. In any of the auctions, by bidding ch ≡ vh/2 the high-value
agent guarantees a payoff at least vh − ch = ch. By bidding cl ≡ vl/2 the low-value agent
guarantees a payoff at least cl = vl− cl. Thus, in a Nash equilibrium the high-value agent’s
payoff is at least ch and the low-value agent’s payoff is at least cl.
We prove the proposition for the winner-bid auction, which we denote by (M,ϕ). The
proof for the loser-bid auction is symmetric. Let γ be the probability with which an agent
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with the high value gets the object when there is a tie. We prove our proposition for the
slightly more general mechanism in which γ ≥ 1/2. The alternative tie breaker γ = 1 may
be relevant in experimental settings.
Let σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v) with vl < vh. Let p be in the support of σh. We claim that p ≤ ch.
Suppose without loss of generality that p is the maximal element in the support of σh.
Suppose by contradiction that p ≥ ch + 1. Since p > cl and γ > 0, the expected payoff of
any bid b > p for the low-valuation agent is strictly lower than the expected payoff of p.
Thus, there is no b > p in the support of σl. Since p− 1 ≥ ch,
Uϕ(p− 1|σl; vh)− Uϕ(p|σl; vh) ≥ (1− σl(x)− σl(x− 1))
+σl(p− 1)(γ + (1− γ)((p − 1)− (vh − p)))
+σl(p)(p − (vh − p))
= (1− σl(x)− σl(x− 1))
+σl(p− 1)(2γ − 1 + 2(1− γ)(p − ch))
+2σl(p)(p − ch) > 0,
where the last inequality holds because σl is a probability distribution, γ ≥ 1/2, and
p− ch ≥ 1. This contradicts p is in the support of σh.
We claim now that p ≥ cl. Suppose without loss of generality that p is the minimal
element in the support of σh. Suppose by contradiction that p ≤ cl−1. We claim that there
is no b < p in the support of σl. Suppose by contradiction there is b < p in the support of
σl. Since cl − p ≥ 1 and b < p,
Uϕ(p+ 1|σh; vl)− Uϕ(b|σh; vl) ≥ σh(p)(vl − (p+ 1)− p) = σh(p)(2(cl − p)− 1) > 0.
This contradicts b is in the support of σl. We claim that σl(p) = 0. Suppose by contradiction
that σl(p) > 0. Then,
Uϕ(p+ 1|σh; vl)− Uϕ(p|σh; vl) ≥ σh(p) (γ(vl − (p+ 1)− p) + (1− γ)(−1))
= σh(p) (γ(2(cl − p)− 1)− (1− γ)) ≥ 0.
If the inequality above holds strictly, there is a contradiction to σl(p) > 0. Since σh(p) > 0,
γ ≥ 1/2, and cl − p ≥ 1, the expression above is equal to zero only when γ = 1/2 and
p = cl − 1. Suppose then that γ = 1/2 and p = cl − 1. Since for each b < p, σl(b) = 0, we
have that
Uϕ(p + 1|σl; vh)− Uϕ(p|σl; vh) ≥
1
2σl(p)(−1) +
1
2σl(p)(vh − cl − (cl − 1))
= σl(p)(ch − cl) > 0.
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This contradicts σh(p) > 0. Thus far we have proved that the support of σl belongs to
(p,+∞). Let b be the minimum element of the support of σl. Thus, p < b. If b < ch,
since γ > 0, agent h would benefit by bidding b instead of p. Thus, b ≥ ch. Recall that the
support of σh belongs to (−∞, ch]. Since the expected payoff of l is at least cl, b ≤ ch, for
otherwise agent l, when bidding b, would receive the object with probability one and pay
the other agent more than ch > cl. Thus, b = ch. Thus, agent l would benefit by bidding
b − 1 instead of b, because ch > cl and σh(p) > 0. This contradicts ch is in the support
of σl. Thus, the support of σl is empty. This is a contradiction. Thus, the support of σh
belongs to [cl, ch].
Let p be the minimum element of the support of σh and b an element in the support of
σl. We claim that b ≤ p. Suppose by contradiction that there is b > p in the support of σl.
Since p ≥ cl, b > cl. Thus, since σh(p) > 0, agent l benefits by bidding cl instead of b. This
contradicts b is in the support of σl. Thus, the support of σl belongs to (−∞, p].
Finally, let p be the minimum of the support of σh. If γ = 1/2 and σ is efficient, the
support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p − 1}. Thus, σh = δp, i.e., agent h receives the object and
pays p to the other agent. Suppose now that σ is inefficient, i.e., σl(p) > 0 and γ = 1/2.
We claim that p = cl and σl(p) < 1/(ch − cl). Recall that, p ∈ [cl, ch]. Since σl(p) > 0,
0 ≥ Uϕ(p − 1|σh; vl)− Uϕ(p|σh; vl) = σh(p)[p − [(vl − p)/2 + p/2]]
= σh(p)(p − cl).
Since σh(p) > 0, p = cl. Recall that agent l has guaranteed vl/2 in each Nash equilibrium
of (M,ϕ, v). If the maximum of the support of σl is cl, then agent h gets in equilibrium at
least what he or she would get by bidding cl+1. This bid gives agent h an expected payoff
of vh − (vl/2 + 1). Thus, the aggregate expected payoff is at least vh − 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove the proposition for the winner-bid auction. The proof
for the loser-bid auction is symmetric. Let σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v). By Proposition 1, there is
p ∈ {vl/2, ..., vh/2} that is in the support of σh such that the support of σl belongs to
{0, ..., p} and the support of σh belongs to {p, ..., p}. Suppose first that σ is efficient.
Thus, support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p − 1}. Thus, σh = δp. Thus, pil(σ) = vl/2 + t
and pih(σ) = vh/2 + ES(v) − t for some t ∈ {0, 1, ..., ES(v)}. One can easily see that
for each t ∈ {0, 1, ..., ES(v)} the distributions σl = δp−1, σh = δp with p = vl/2 + t is a
Nash equilibrium. Suppose now that σ is inefficient. By Proposition 1, pil(σ) = vl/2 and
pih(σ) ≥ vh/2 + ES(v) − 1. Since σ is inefficient pih(σ) < vh/2 + ES(v). Thus, there is
ε ∈ (0, 1] such that pih(σ) = vh/2 + ES(v) − ε. Finally, let ε ∈ (0, 1] and α = ε/ES(v).
Consider the distributions σl = (1 − α)δvl/2−1 + αδvl/2 and σh = δvl/2. Direct calculation
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yields, Uϕ(vl/2|σl; vh) − Uϕ(vl/2 + 1|σl; vh) = 1 − αES(v). Since α ∈ [0, 1/ES(v)], agent
h weakly prefers to bid vl/2 than vl/2 + 1. One can easily see that this implies vl/2 is a
best response for h to σl. One can also easily see that σl is a best response to σh for l.
Moreover, pih(σ) = Uϕ(vl/2|σ
α
l ; vh) = vh/2 + ES(v) − αES(v) = vh/2 + ES(v) − ε and
pil(σ) = vl/2.
Proof of Lemma 2. (M,ϕ) be a mechanism satisfying the property in the statement of
the lemma. Let v ∈ Θ, 0 ≤ t ≤ ES(v), and a ∈ A an allocation at which h’s payoff is
vh/2+t and l’s payoff is vl/2+ES(v)−t. The aggregate utility at a is vh. Thus, a is efficient
and h receives the object at a. We claim that a is envy-free. Since h is receiving more than
half her value, she does not prefer the allotment of the other agent to her own. Moreover,
she transfers the other agent ph ≡ vh/2 − t. Thus, l weakly prefers her allotment at a to
that of h because vl/2−(ES(v)−t) ≤ vl/2+(ES(v)−t). Let v
∗
l = v
∗
l ≡ 2ph. Then, vh ≥ v
∗
h
and v∗l ≥ vl. By the property in the statement of the lemma, there is σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v
∗) that
obtains a with certainty. We claim that σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v). We prove first that σl is a best
response to σh for l with type vl. Let ml ∈Ml be in the support of σl and m
′
l ∈Ml. Then
Uϕ(ml|σh; vl) = Uϕ(ml|σh; v
∗
l ) ≥ Uϕ(m
′
l|σh; v
∗
l ) ≥ Uϕ(m
′
l|σh; vl).
Where the first equality holds because in equilibrium σ, l gets paid v∗/2 with certainty;
the first inequality is the equilibrium condition for l with type v∗l ; and the third inequality
holds because the expected utility index of an allotment for l with value vl is less than or
equal than the expected utility index of the allotment for l with value v∗l .
Let mh ∈Mh be in the support of σh and m
′
h ∈Mh. Since σ produces a with certainty,
Uϕ(mh|σl; vh) − Uϕ(mh|σl; v
∗
h) = vh − v
∗
h. Since the utility index of h is invariant when
receiving an amount of money and no object, Uϕ(m
′
h|σl; vh) − Uϕ(m
′
h|σl; v
∗
h) ≤ vh − v
∗
h.
Thus,
Uϕ(m
′
h|σl; vh)− Uϕ(mh|σl; vh) ≤ Uϕ(m
′
h|σl; v
∗
h)− Uϕ(mh|σl; v
∗
h) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality is the equilibrium condition for σ with types v∗. Thus, σh is a
best response to σl for h with type vh.
Proof of necessity in Theorem 1. We first prove that h’s expected payoff in an empir-
ical equilibrium of the winner-bid auction is bounded below by the expression in statement
1 of the theorem. The proof for the loser-bid auction is symmetric.
Let (M,ϕ) be the winner-bid auction and v ∈ Θ. Let σ ∈ N(M,ϕ, v). For i ∈ N , let
ci ≡ vi/2. By Proposition 1 there is p ∈ {cl, ..., ch} separating the supports of σl and σh,
i.e., such that the support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p}; the support of σh belongs to {p, ..., p};
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and p belongs to the support of σh. Suppose that p > cl + 1. Since p is a best response
to σl for h with type vh, h’s expected payoff of p should be at least the expected payoff of
p− 1. Thus,
vh − p ≥ σl(p− 1)
[
1
2
(vh − (p− 1)) +
1
2
(p− 1)
]
+ (1− σl(p− 1))(vh − (p − 1)).
Equivalently,
σl(p− 1) ≥ 1/(ch − p+ 1). (4)
Let σ be an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) and let p be its associated separating bid (in
the support of σh). Let {σ
λ}λ∈N be a sequence of interior payoff monotone distributions
for (M,ϕ, v) that converges to σ as λ→∞. This sequence exist by Theorem 3. For i ∈ N
and {b, d} ⊆ {0, 1, ..., p}, let ∆i(b, d) be the difference in expected utility for agent i in the
winner-bid auction between the two situations in which agent i bids strictly to the left of
b and bids exactly d, conditional on agent −i bidding b. Using this notation we have that
when b < d,
Uϕ(b|σ−i, vi)−Uϕ(d|σ−i, vi) =
∑
r<b
σ−i(r)(d− b)+σ−i(b)(d− ci)+
∑
b<r≤d
σ−i(r)∆i(r, d). (5)
We prove that the expected payoff for h given σ satisfies the lower bound in the statement
of the theorem.
Case 1: ES(v) = 1. Recall that we require valuations to be positive. Thus, cl > 0. Let
λ ∈ N. By (5),
Uϕ(cl − 1|σ
λ
h , vl)− Uϕ(cl|σ
λ
h , vl) =
∑
r<cl−1
σh(r) + 0 + 0 ≥ 0.
By payoff monotonicity, σλl (cl) ≤ σ
λ
l (cl − 1). By convergence, σl(cl) ≤ σl(cl − 1). Thus,
σl(cl) ≤ 1/2. We claim that p = cl. Suppose by contradiction that p = ch = cl + 1. By
Proposition 1, the support of σl belongs to {0, ..., cl}. Thus,
Uϕ(cl|σl, vh)− Uϕ(ch|σl, vh) = (1− σl(cl))(ch + 1) + σl(cl)ch − ch > 0.
This contradicts σ is a Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v). Thus, p = cl. If σ is efficient,
pih = vh/2 + 1. In general,
Uϕ(p|σl, vh) ≥ (1− σl(cl))(ch + 1) + σl(cl)ch ≥ vh/2 + 1/2,
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i.e., pih(σ) ≥ vh/2 + 1/2.
Case 2: ES(v) > 1 and σ is efficient. Let t ≡ p − cl − 1 and suppose that t ≥ 1. Let
d ≡ p− 1. Then
∆l(d, d) = d− ((vl − d)/2 + d/2) = t.
Let r < d and n = d− r. Then,
∆l(r, d) = r − (vl − d) = cl + t− n− (2cl − cl − t) = 2t− n.
Thus, for each max{0, cl − 3t} ≤ b < d, we have that
Uϕ(b|σ
λ
h , vl)− Uϕ(d|σ
λ
h , vl) =
∑
r<b
σλh(r)(d− b) + σ
λ
h(b)t+
∑
b<r≤d
σλh(r)∆l(r, d). (6)
We claim that there is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ and each max{0, cl − 3t} ≤ b < d,
Uϕ(b|σ
λ
h , vl)− Uϕ(d|σ
λ
h , vl) ≥ 0. (7)
Let cl − t − 1 ≤ b < d. For each d − 2t ≤ r, ∆l(r, d) ≥ 0. Thus, by (6), for each λ ∈ N,
Uϕ(b|σ
λ
h , vl) − Uϕ(d|σ
λ
h , vl) ≥ 0. By payoff monotonicity, σ
λ
l (b) ≥ σ
λ
l (d). By convergence,
σl(b) ≥ σl(d). We complete the proof of our claim by proving by induction on η ∈ {1, ..., 2t}
that the claim holds for b = cl − t − η. Let η ∈ {2, ..., 2t} and suppose that for each
cl − t − η < g < d, σl(g) ≥ σl(d). Let b ≡ cl − t − η. We claim that there is Λ ∈ N
for which for each λ ≥ Λ, the third term in the righthand side of (6) is non-negative, i.e.,∑
b<r≤d σ
λ
h(r)∆l(r, d) ≥ 0. Note that
∑
b<r≤d
σλh(r)∆l(r, d) ≥
∑
1≤r≤η−1
(σλh(cl − t+ r)− σ
λ
h(cl − t− r))r.
Thus, in order to prove our claim it is enough to show that there is Λ ∈ N such that for
each λ ≥ Λ and each r ∈ {1, .., η − 1}, σλh(cl − t+ r) ≥ σ
λ
h(cl − t− r). Let r ∈ {1, .., η − 1}.
Then,
∆h(cl− t+r, cl− t+r) = cl− t+r− ((vh− (cl− t+r))/2+(cl− t+r)/2) = −(ch−cl+ t−r).
Let 1 ≤ s ≤ 2r − 1. Then,
∆h(cl − t+ r− s, cl − t+ r) = cl − t+ r− s− (vh − (cl − t+ r)) = −(2(ch − cl + t− r) + s).
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Observe that
Uϕ(cl − t+ r|σl, vh)− Uϕ(cl − t− r|σl, vh) = −
∑
0≤s<cl−t−r
σl(s)2r
+σl(cl − t− r)(vh − (cl − t+ r)− ((vh − (cl − t− r))/2 + (cl − t− r)/2))
−
∑
1≤s≤2r−1 σl(cl − t+ r − s)∆h(cl − t+ r − s, cl − t+ r)
−σl(cl − t+ r)∆h(cl − t+ r, cl − t+ r).
Thus,
Uϕ(cl − t+ r|σl, vh)− Uϕ(cl − t− r|σl, vh) ≥ −(1−
∑
0≤s≤2r σl(cl − t+ r − s))2r
+σl(cl − t− r)(ch − cl + t− r)
+
∑
1≤s≤2r−1 σl(cl − t+ r − s)(2(ch − cl + t− r) + s)
+σl(cl − t+ r)(ch − cl + t− r).
Since cl − t− r ≥ cl − t− η + 1 = b+ 1, for each 0 ≤ s ≤ 2r, b + 1 ≤ cl − t+ r − s. Since
r ≤ η − 1 and η ≤ 2t, cl − t + r ≤ cl + t − 1 < d. By the induction hypothesis, for each
0 ≤ s ≤ 2r, σl(cl − t+ r− s) ≥ σl(d) = σl(p− 1). By (4), σl(cl − t+ r− s) ≥ 1/(ch − p+1).
Thus,
Uϕ(cl − t+ r|σl, vh)− Uϕ(cl − t− r|σl, vh) ≥
−(1− 2r+1ch−p+1)2r +
2r
ch−p+1
2(ch − cl + t− r) >
2r
ch−p+1
(2(ch − cl)− (ch − p+ 1)).
Since p ≥ cl and ch > cl + 1, 2(ch − cl) − (ch − p + 1) > 0. Thus, Uϕ(cl − t+ r|σl, vh) −
Uϕ(cl − t− r|σl, vh) > 0. Thus, there is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ, Uϕ(cl − t+ r|σ
λ
l , vh)−
Uϕ(cl − t− r|σ
λ
l , vh) > 0. By payoff monotonicity, σ
λ
h(cl−t+r) ≥ σ
λ
h(cl−t−r). Thus, there
is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ and each r ∈ {1, .., η − 1}, σλh(cl − t+ r) ≥ σ
λ
h(cl − t− r).
Thus, for each λ ≥ Λ,
∑
b<r≤d σ
λ
h(r)∆l(r, d) ≥ 0 and
Uϕ(b|σh, vl)− Uϕ(d|σh, vl) ≥ 0.
By payoff monotonicity σλl (b) ≥ σ
λ
l (d). By convergence, σl(b) ≥ σl(d).
We have proved that when p− 1 ≥ cl + 1, for each max{cl − 3t, 0} ≤ b ≤ p− 1,
σl(b) ≥ σl(p − 1). (8)
There are two sub-cases
Case 2.1: vl ≤ 3vh/8. We claim that p ≤ ES(v)/2− vl/4+ 1/2 = vh/4+1/2. Suppose
by contradiction that p > vh/4+ 1/2. Since p and cl are integers, p ≥ ⌊vh/4+ 1/2⌋+1 and
cl ≤ ⌈3vh/16⌉ ≤ 3vh/16. Then, p− 1− cl ≥ ⌊vh/4 + 1/2⌋ + 1− ⌈3vh/16⌉. Since vh is even,
26
⌊vh/4+1/2⌋ ≥ vh/4 and p ≥ vh/4+1. Thus, p−1−cl ≥ vh/16. Thus, p−1−cl ≥ 1 whenever
vh ≥ 16. Since ES(v) > 1, then vh ≥ 6 (recall that we assumed positive even valuations).
Direct calculation determines that ⌊vh/4 + 1/2⌋ + 1 − ⌈3vh/16⌉ ≥ 1 for vh = {6, ..., 14}.
Since, t = p − cl − 1 ≥ vh/4 − cl ≥ vh/16 = ch/8, cl − 3t ≤ cl − 3ch/8 ≤ 0. Thus,
max{cl−3t, 0} = 0. Since t ≥ 1, by (8), σl(p−1) ≤ 1/(cl+t+1) = 1/(cl+p−1−cl+1) = 1/p.
By (4), 1/(ch − p + 1) ≤ 1/p. Thus, p ≤ ch/2 + 1/2 = vh/4 + 1/2. This contradicts
p ≥ vh/4 + 1. Since σ is efficient and σh(p) > 0, the support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p − 1}.
Thus, pih(σ) ≥ vh−p ≥ vh−(vh/4+1/2) = vh/2+vh/4−1/2 = vh/2+ES(v)/2+vl/2−1/2.
Note that if vl ≤ 3vh/8 and ES(v) = 2, then vl = 2. Thus, statements (a) and (b) in the
theorem have no overlap.
Case 2.2: vl > 3vh/8. We claim that p ≤ vl/2 + (vh/2 − vl/2)/5 + 4/5. Suppose by
contradiction that p > q ≡ ⌊vl/2 + (vh/2 − vl/2)/5 + 4/5⌋. Since vl/2 and vh/2 − vl/2 > 1
are integers, q ≥ vl/2 + 1 = cl + 1. Moreover, q = vl/2 + (vh/2 − vl/2)/5 + ε where
ε ∈ {0, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5}. Let n ≡ p− q ≥ 1 and tq ≡ q− cl ≥ 1. Then, tq = vl/2+ (vh/2−
vl/2)/5+ε−cl = (ch−cl)/5+ε. Thus, cl−3tq = cl−3(ch−cl)/5−3ε ≥ 8(cl−3ch/8)/5−3ε.
Since vl > 3vh/8, cl > 3ch/8. Since cl and ch are integers, cl − 3ch/8 ≥ 1/8. Thus,
cl − 3tq ≥ 1/5 − 3ε. Thus, if ε ≤ 1/5, cl − 3tq ≥ 0; if 2/5 ≤ ε ≤ 3/5, cl − 3tq ≥ −1; and if
ε = 4/5, cl − 3tq ≥ −2. Suppose that ε ≤ 1/5. Since tq ≥ 1, by (8), σl(p− 1) ≤ 1/(4tq +1).
By (4), 1/(ch − p+ 1) ≤ 1/(4tq + 1). Thus, 1/(ch − q − n+ 1) ≤ 1/(4tq + 1). Equivalently,
ch − 4tq − n ≥ q. Since n ≥ 1 and tq = (ch − cl)/5 + ε, ch − 4(ch − cl)/5 − 4ε − 1 ≥ q.
Equivalently, q−5ε−1 = cl+(ch−cl)/5−5ε−1 ≥ q. This is a contradiction. Suppose that
2/5ε ≤ 3/5. Since tq ≥ 1, by (8), σl(p−1) ≤ 1/(4tq−1+1). By (4), 1/(ch−p+1) ≤ 1/(4tq).
Thus, 1/(ch − q − n + 1) ≤ 1/(4tq). Equivalently, ch − 4tq − n + 1 ≥ q. Since n ≥ 1 and
tq = (ch−cl)/5+ε, ch−4(ch−cl)/5−4ε ≥ q. Equivalently, q−5ε = cl+(ch−cl)/5−5ε−1 ≥ q.
This is a contradiction. Finally, suppose that ε = 4/5. Since tq ≥ 1, by (8), σl(p − 1) ≤
1/(4tq − 2 + 1). By (4), 1/(ch − p + 1) ≤ 1/(4tq − 1). Thus, 1/(ch − q − n + 1) ≤
1/(4tq − 1). Equivalently, ch − 4tq − n + 1 + 1 ≥ q. Since n ≥ 1 and tq = (ch − cl)/5 + ε,
ch − 4(ch − cl)/5− 4ε+ 1 ≥ q. Equivalently, q − 3 = cl + (ch − cl)/5− 5ε+ 1 ≥ q. This is a
contradiction. Since σ is efficient and σh(p) > 0, the support of σl belongs to {0, ..., p − 1}.
Thus, pih(σ) ≥ vh − p ≥ vh − (vl/2 + (vh/2− vl/2)/5 + 4/5) = vh/2 + 4ES(v)/5 − 4/5.
Suppose now that ES(v) = 2. Recall that σ is efficient. Since vl > 3vh/8, vl > 2. Since
pih(σ) ≥ vh/2 + 4ES(v)/5 − 4/5 = vh/2 + 4/5, p ≤ cl + 1. We prove that p = cl. Suppose
by contradiction that p = cl + 1, i.e., pih(σ) = vh/2 + 1. By Proposition 1, σh = δp. Let
{σλ}λ∈N be a sequence interior payoff monotone distributions such that as λ→∞, σ
λ → σ.
Since Uϕ(cl − 2|σh; vl) − Uϕ(cl + 1|σh; vl) = cl + 1 − cl = 1, there is Λ ∈ N such that for
each λ ≥ Λ, Uϕ(cl − 2|σ
λ
h ; vl) > Uϕ(cl + 1|σ
λ
h ; vl). By payoff monotonicity, for each λ ≥ Λ,
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σλl (cl − 2) ≥ σ
λ
l (cl + 1). By convergence, σl(cl − 2) ≥ σl(cl + 1). Notice also that for each
λ ∈ N, Uϕ(cl − 1|σ
λ
h ; vl) ≥ Uϕ(cl|σ
λ
h; vl). Thus, for each λ ∈ N, σ
λ
l (cl − 1) ≥ σ
λ
l (cl). Now,
Uϕ(cl + 1|σ
λ
l ; vh)− Uϕ(cl|σ
λ
l ; vh) =
∑
b<cl
σλl (b)(−1) + σ
λ
l (cl)(ch + 1− ch)
+σλl (cl + 1)(ch − (ch − 1))
≤ −σλl (cl − 2)− σ
λ
l (cl − 1)
+σλl (cl) + σ
λ
l (cl + 1) ≤ 0.
By payoff monotonicity, for each λ ≥ Λ, σλh(cl) ≥ σ
λ
h(cl + 1). By convergence, σh(cl) ≥
σh(cl + 1). Since p = cl + 1 is in the support of σh, cl is also in the support of σh. This
contradicts that the support of σh is contained in {p, ..., p}.
Finally, suppose that ES(v) > 2 and vl ≥ 7vh/12 − 7/6. We claim that p < vl/2 +
(vh/2− vl/2)/5 +4/5. Suppose by contradiction that p = vl/2+ (vh/2− vl/2)/5 +4/5. Let
y ≡ cl − 3(p − 1 − cl). Direct calculation yields that since vl ≥ 7vh/12 − 7/6, y ≥ ch − p.
By (7), there is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ, and each max{0, cl − 3t} ≤ b < p − 1,
σλl (b) ≥ σ
λ
l (p− 1). Since p is in the support of σh and p > cl, for each b < p, Uϕ(b|σh; vl) >
Uϕ(p|σh; vl). Thus, we can suppose without loss of generality that for each λ ≥ Λ and each
b < p, Uϕ(b|σ
λ
h ; vl) > Uϕ(p|σ
λ
h ; vl) and consequently σ
λ
l (b) ≥ σ
λ
l (p). Thus,
Uϕ(p|σ
λ
l ; vh)− Uϕ(p− 1|σ
λ
l ; vh) =
∑
b<p−1 σ
λ
l (b)(−1)
+σλl (p− 1)(2ch − p− ch) + σ
λ
l (p)(ch − p)
= σλl (p)(ch − p)−
∑
0≤b<y σ
λ
l (b)
−
∑
y≤b≤p−1 σ
λ
l (b) + (ch − p+ 1)σ
λ
l (p− 1)
≤ σλl (p)(ch − p)−
∑
0≤b<y σ
λ
l (p)
−
∑
y≤b≤p−1 σ
λ
l (p − 1) + (ch − p+ 1)σ
λ
l (p − 1)
≤ σλl (p − 1)(ch − p+ 1− 4(p − 1− cl)− 1) = 0,
where the last equality follows from direct calculation given that p = cl+(ch−cl)/5+4/5. By
payoff monotonicity, for each λ ≥ Λ, σλh(p−1) ≥ σ
λ
h(p). By convergence, σh(p−1) ≥ σh(p).
Thus, p − 1 is in the support of σh. This contradicts that the support of σh belongs to
{p, ..., p}.
Proof of sufficiency in Theorem 1. Let (M,ϕ) be an EPA and v ∈ Θ such that vl <
vh. We prove that each Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, v) satisfying the bounds in the statement
of the theorem is an empirical equilibrium. We prove it for WB. The proof for LB is
symmetric. We consider four cases.
Case 1. Let (pil, pih) be such that pil = cl and ch+ES(v) > pih ≥ ch+1/2 if ES(v) = 1
and ch+ES(v) > pih ≥ ch+ES(v)−1 if ES(v) > 1. (Note that this case covers all inefficient
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empirical equilibria.) Let 0 < α ≤ min{1/2, 1/ES(v)}, min{α/3, 1/10, (1 − α)/2(p − 1)} >
ε > 0, and κ > 0. For each xh ∈ R
Mh and xl ∈ R
Mh , let
f ε,κh (xh) = (1− ε)δcl + εl
κ(x).
f ε,κl (xh) = (1− α+ ε)δcl−1 + (α− 2ε)δcl + εl
κ(x).
Let {κt}t∈N such that fore each t ∈ N, κt ∈ N, be such that as t→∞, κt →∞. Let {γ
t}t∈N
be such that for each t ∈ N, γt is a fixed point of the composition of (f ε,κh , f
ε,κ
h ) with the
expected payoff operator, i.e., the continuous mapping that assigns to each profile of mixed
strategies σ,
F ε,κt(σ) ≡ (f ε,κtl (Uϕ(b|σh; vl)b∈{0,...,p}), f
ε,κt
h (Uϕ(b|σl; vh)b∈{0,...,p})).
Existence of γ is guaranteed by Brower’s fixed point theorem. Denote Uϕ(b|γ
t
h; vl) = u
t
l(b)
and Uϕ(b|γ
t
l ; vh) = u
t
h(b). Let p ∈ {cl − 1, cl} and b < p. Then,
uth(p)− u
t
h(b) =
∑
d<b γ
t
l (d)(−(p − b)) + γ
t
l (b)(vh − p− ch)
+
∑
b<d<p γ
t
l (d)(vh − p− d) + γ
t
l (p)(ch − p)
> −εp+ γtl (b)ES(v) +
∑
b<d<p γ
t
l (d)2ES(v) + γ
t
l (p)ES(v)
≥ −εp+ (1− α+ ε) > (1− α)/2 > 0.
Suppose now that b > cl. Then,
uth(cl)− u
t
h(b) =
∑
d<cl
γtl (d)(b− cl) + γ
t
l (cl)(ch − (vh − b))
+
∑
cl<d<b
γtl (d)(d− (vh − b)) + γ
t
l (b)(b − ch)
> (1− α+ ε) + (α− 2ε+ ε)(1 − ES(v))
≥ 1− αES(v) + ε+ ε(ES(v) − 1) > 0.
Moreover,
utl(cl)− u
t
l(b) =
∑
d<cl
γth(d)(b− cl) + γ
t
h(cl)(cl − (vl − b))
+
∑
cl<d<b
γth(d)(d− (vl − b)) + γ
t
h(b)(b− cl)
≥ (1− ε)(b − cl) > 0;
utl(cl − 1)− u
t
l(cl) =
∑
d<cl−1
γth(d) > 0.
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Now, let b < cl − 1.
utl(cl)− u
t
l(b) =
∑
d<b γ
t
h(d)(−(cl − b)) + γ
t
h(b)(vl − cl − cl)
+
∑
b<d<cl
γth(d)(vl − cl − d) + γ
t
h(cl)(cl − cl)
≥ −
∑
d<b γ
t
h(d)cl + γ
t
h(cl − 1)
= γth(cl − 1)
(
1−
∑
d<b
γth(d)
γth(cl−1)
cl
)
= γth(cl − 1)
(
1−
∑
d<cl−1
γth(d)
γth(cl−1)
cl
)
= γth(cl − 1)
(
1− cl
∑
d<cl−1
eκtuh(d)
eκtuh(cl−1)
cl
)
= γth(cl − 1)
(
1− cl
∑
d<cl−1
e−κt(uh(cl−1)−uh(d))
)
≥ γth(cl − 1)
(
1− cl
∑
d<cl−1
e−κt(1−α)/2
)
.
Since as t → ∞, κt → ∞, there is T ∈ N for which for each b < cl − 1 and each t ≥ T ,
utl(cl) − u
t
l(b) > 0. Since l
κt is strictly monotone, for each i ∈ N and each pair {b, d} ⊆
{0, ..., p}, γti(b) ≥ γ
t
i(d) if and only if Uϕ(b|γ
t
−i; vi) ≥ Uϕ(d|γ
t
−i; vi). Thus, for a sequence
{εt}t∈N that converges to zero, there is a divergent sequence of natural numbers {κt}t∈N
and a sequence of distribution profiles {γt}t∈N such that (i) for each t ∈ N , each i ∈ N , and
each pair {b, d} ⊆ {0, ..., p}, γti (b) ≥ γ
t
i (d) if and only if Uϕ(b|γ
t
−i; vi) ≥ Uϕ(d|γ
t
−i; vi); (ii) γ
t
is a fixed point of F εt,κt. Thus, as t→∞, γtl → (1−α)δcl−1+αδcl and γ
t
h → δcl . Standard
arguments show that the limit distribution profile is a Nash equilibrium in which pil = vl/2
and pih = vh/2 + ES(v) − αES(v). Thus, this case spans all inefficient empirical equilibria
of the winner-bid auction.
Case 2: Let (pil, pih) be such that pil = cl and pih = ch + ES(v). Let ε > 0 and κ > 0.
For each xh ∈ R
Mh and xl ∈ R
Mh, let
f ε,κh (xh) = (1− ε)δcl + εl
κ(x).
f ε,κl (xh) = (1− ε)δcl−1 + εl
κ(x).
Let {κt}t∈N such that fore each t ∈ N, κt ∈ N, be such that as t → ∞, κt → ∞. Let
{γt}t∈N be such that for each t ∈ N, γ
t is a fixed point of the composition of (f ε,κh , f
ε,κ
l )
and the expected payoff operator. As t → ∞, γth → δcl and γ
t
l → δcl−1. Let σ be this
limit distribution profile (in pure strategies). Then, pil(σ) = cl and pih(σ) = ch + ES(v).
In order to complete the construction as in Case 1, we need to show that ε can be selected
small enough such that for a sequence of divergent κs, eventually the distribution is strictly
monotone with respect to expected payoffs. The expected payoff of cl given σ for h, is
greater than the payoff of any other bid. The expected payoff of cl − 1 given σ for l is
greater than the payoff of any bid higher than cl − 1. Thus, it is only necessary to show
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that the expected payoff of cl − 1, for the distribution profile γ
t for l, is eventually greater
than the payoff of any bid lower than cl − 1. For each b < cl − 1,
uth(cl − 1)− u
t
h(b) =
∑
d<b γ
t
l (d)(−(cl − 1− b)) + γ
t
l (b)(vh − cl + 1− ch)
+
∑
b<d<cl−1
γtl (d)(vh − cl + 1− d) + γ
t
l (cl − 1)(ch − cl + 1)
> −εp+ 2(1− ε).
Thus, the argument in Case 1 can be easily reproduced for the sequence of fixed points.
Case 3: cl = 1, ch = 3, pil = cl + 1, and pih = ch + 1. This is the unique case where
ES(v) = 2 and vl ≤ 3vh/8. Let ε > 0 and κ > 0. For each xh ∈ R
Mh and xl ∈ R
Mh, let
f ε,κh (xh) = (1− ε)δcl+1 + εl
κ(x).
f ε,κl (xh) = (1/2 − ε)δcl−1 + (1/2 − ε)δcl + εδcl+1 + εl
κ(x).
Let {κt}t∈N such that fore each t ∈ N, κt ∈ N, be such that as t → ∞, κt → ∞. Let
{γt}t∈N be such that for each t ∈ N, γ
t is a fixed point of the composition of (f ε,κh , f
ε,κ
l )
and the expected payoff operator. As t→∞, γth → δcl and γ
t
l → δcl−1. Let σ be this limit
distribution profile. Then, pil(σ) = cl+1 and pih(σ) = ch+ES(v)− 1. In order to complete
the construction as in Case 1, we need to show that ε can be selected small enough such
that for a sequence of divergent κs, eventually the distribution is strictly monotone with
respect to expected payoffs. The expected payoff of cl+1 given σ for h, is greater than the
payoff of cl − 1 and any bid greater than cl + 1. The expected payoff of cl − 1 and cl given
σ for l is greater than the payoff of any bid higher than cl − 1. Thus, it is only necessary
to show that the expected payoff of cl+1, for the distribution profile γ
t for h, is eventually
greater than the payoff of cl.
uth(cl + 1)− u
t
h(cl) = −σ
t
l (0) + γ
t
l (1) + 2σ
t
l (2)
> −(1/2− ε+ ε) + (1/2 − ε) + 2ε > 0.
Thus, the argument in Case 1 can be easily reproduced for the sequence of fixed points.
Case 4: pil = cl+1 and pih = ch+ES(v)− 1 and ES(v) > 2. Let ε > 0 and κ > 0. For
each xh ∈ R
Mh and xl ∈ R
Mh , let
f ε,κh (xh) = (1− ε)δcl+1 + εl
κ(x).
f ε,κl (xh) = (1/2 − ε)δcl−1 + (1/2 − ε)δcl + 2εl
κ(x).
Let {κt}t∈N such that fore each t ∈ N, κt ∈ N, be such that as t → ∞, κt → ∞. Let
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{γt}t∈N be such that for each t ∈ N, γ
t is a fixed point of the composition of (f ε,κh , f
ε,κ
l )
and the expected payoff operator. As t→∞, γth → δcl and γ
t
l → (1/2)δcl−1 + (1/2)δcl . Let
σ be this limit distribution profile. Then, pil(σ) = cl + 1 and pih(σ) = ch + ES(v) − 1. In
order to complete the construction as in Case 1, we need to show that ε can be selected
small enough such that for a sequence of divergent κs, eventually the distribution is strictly
monotone with respect to expected payoffs. The expected payoff of cl + 1 given σ for h, is
greater than the payoff of any other bid. The expected payoff of cl − 1 and cl given σ for l
is greater than the payoff of any bid higher than cl. Thus, it is only necessary to show that
the expected payoff of cl +1, for the distribution profile γ
t for h, is eventually greater than
the payoff of cl. Note that the expected payoff of cl − 1 is never less than that of cl for l.
For each b < cl − 1,
uth(cl − 1)− u
t
h(b) =
∑
d<b γ
t
l (d)(−(cl − 1− b)) + γ
t
l (b)(vh − cl + 1− ch)
+
∑
b<d<cl−1
γtl (d)(vh − cl + 1− d) + γ
t
l (cl − 1)(ch − cl + 1)
> −2εp+ 4(1/2 − ε).
Thus, the argument in Case 1 can be easily reproduced for the sequence of fixed points.
Case 5: cl ≤ 3ch/8, cl + 1 < p ≤ vh/4 + 1/2, pil = p and pih = vh − p and ES(v) > 2.
Let ε > 0 and κ > 0. For each xh ∈ R
Mh and xl ∈ R
Mh , let
f ε,κh (xh) = (1− ε)δcl+1 + εl
κ(x).
f ε,κl (xh) = (1/p − ε)

∑
b<p
δb

+ (p − 1)εδp + εlκ(x).
Let {κt}t∈N such that fore each t ∈ N, κt ∈ N, be such that as t → ∞, κt → ∞. Let
{γt}t∈N be such that for each t ∈ N, γ
t is a fixed point of the composition of (f ε,κh , f
ε,κ
l ) and
the expected payoff operator. As t → ∞, γth → δp and γ
t
l → (1/p)
∑
b<p δb. Let σ be this
limit distribution profile. Then, pil(σ) = p and pih(σ) = vh − p. In order to complete the
construction as in Case 1, we need to show that ε can be selected small enough such that
for a sequence of divergent κs, eventually the distribution is strictly monotone with respect
to expected payoffs. The expected payoff of p given σ for h, is greater than the payoff of any
bid greater than p. The expected payoff of each bid less than or equal to p− 1 given σ for
l is greater than the payoff of any bid greater than or equal to p. The expected payoff of p
given σ for l is greater than the payoff of any bid greater than p. Thus, it is only necessary
to show that the expected payoff of p, for the distribution profile γt for h, is eventually
greater than the payoff of each b < p. Since 2 ≤ cl + 1 < p ≤ vh/4 + 1/2 = ch + 1/2,
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(ch − p+ 1)/p ≥ 1,
uth(p)− u
t
h(p− 1) = −
∑
d<p−1 γ
t
l (d) + γ
t
l (p − 1)(vh − p− ch)
+γtl (p)(ch − p)
> −(1/p − ε)(p − 1)− ε+ (1/p − ε)(ch − p) + (p− 1)ε(ch − p)
= −1 + 1/p + ε(p− 1)− ε+ (ch − p+ 1)/p − 1/p
−ε(ch − p) + (p− 1)ε(ch − p) ≥ 0.
Moreover, for b < p,
uth(b)− u
t
h(b− 1) = −
∑
d<b−1 γ
t
l (d) + γ
t
l (b− 1)(vh − b− ch)
+γtl (b)(ch − b)
> −(1/p − ε)(b − 1)− ε+ 2(1/p − ε)(ch − b)
≥ −b/p + 1/p + ε(b− 1)− ε+ 2(ch − b+ 1)/p − 2/p − 2ε(ch − b)
≥ 1− 2ε(ch − b)− ε− 1/p.
Thus, the argument in Case 1 can be easily reproduced for the sequence of fixed points.
Case 6: vl > 3vh/8, cl + 1 < p < vl/2 + (vh/2 − vl/2)/5 + 4/5, pil = p and pih = vh − p
and ES(v) > 2. Let y ≡ cl − 3(p− 1− cl). Since p− 1 ≤ cl + (vh/2− vl/2)/5 + 4/5− 1 and
cl > 3ch/8, y > 0. Let n ≡ p− y = 4(p− 1− cl)+ 1. Since p < vl/2+ (vh/2− vl/2)/5+4/5,
1/(4(p − 1 − cl) + 1) > 1/(ch − p + 1). Thus, 1/n > 1/(ch − p + 1). Let σ be defined by:
σh = δp and σl ≡ (1/n)
∑
y≤b<p δb. Then, Uϕ(p|σl; vh) − Uϕ(p − 1|σl; vh) = −(n − 1)/n +
(1/n)(ch−p) > 0. Thus, p is a unique best response to σl for h. Clearly, σl is a best response
to σh for l. Thus, σ is a Nash equilibrium with payoffs pil(σ) = p and pih(σ) = vh− p. Now,
for y ≤ b− 1 < b ≤ p− 1,
Uϕ(b|σl; vh)− Uϕ(b− 1|σl; vh) ≥ −(n− 2)/n + (1/n)(ch − b) + (1/n)(ch − b) > 1.
Thus, Uϕ(b|σl; vh) strictly increases in the set b ∈ {y, ..., p}. Let r ∈ {p, ..., p} be the
maximum for which Uϕ(r|σl; vh) ≥ Uϕ(y|σl; vh). Thus, Uϕ(r + 1|σl; vh) < Uϕ(y|σl; vh).
Now, for each b < y,
Uϕ(y|σl; vh)− Uϕ(b|σl; vh) ≥ σl(y)(ch − y) ≥ ES(v)/n > 0.
Thus, there is ε > 0 for which for each distribution profile γ such that ||σ − γ||∞ < ε,
(i) there is a constant c > 0 such that for each b 6= p, Uϕ(p|γl; vh) − Uϕ(b|γl; vh) ≥ c;
(ii) for each b ∈ {y, ..., r} and each d < y or d > r, Uϕ(b|γl; vh) − Uϕ(d|γl; vh) > 0; (iii)
Uϕ(b|γl; vh) strictly increases in the set b ∈ {y, ..., p}; and (iv) for each b ≤ p − 1 < d,
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Uϕ(b|γh; vl)− Uϕ(d|γh; vl) > 0.
Let κ > 0 and η ≡ ε/2(r − y + 2). For each xh ∈ R
Mh and xl ∈ R
Mh , let
f ε,κh (xh) = (1− ε/2)δp + η
∑
y≤b≤r
δb + ηl
κ(x).
f ε,κl (xh) = (1/n − ε)

 ∑
y≤b<p
δb

+ nεlκ(x).
Let {κt}t∈N such that fore each t ∈ N, κt ∈ N; and as t→∞, κt →∞. Let {γ
t}t∈N be such
that for each t ∈ N, γt is a fixed point of the composition of (f ε,κth , f
ε,κt
l ) and the expected
payoff operator. Then, ||γt − σ||∞ < ε. Thus, for each t ∈ N, γ
t satisfies conditions (i)-(iv)
above. By (i) and (ii), for each t ∈ N and each pair {b, d} ⊆ {0, ..., p}, γth(b) ≥ γ
t
h(d) if
and only if Uϕ(b|γ
t
l ; vh) − Uϕ(d|γ
tl; vh). By (iv), for each t ∈ N and each b ≤ p − 1 < d,
Uϕ(b|γ
t
h; vl) − Uϕ(d|γ
t
h; vl) > 0. By (iii) we can reproduce the argument in our proof of
necessity in Theorem 1 and show that for each t ∈ N and each y ≤ b < p− 1, Uϕ(b|γ
t
h; vl)−
Uϕ(p − 1|γ
t
h; vl) ≥ 0. Now, by (i), as t→∞, γ
t
h → γh ≡ (1−ε/2+η)δp+η
∑
y≤b≤r δb. Direct
calculation shows that for each b < y, Uϕ(p − 1|γh; vl)− Uϕ(b|γh; vl) = (p− 1− cl)η. Thus,
there is T ∈ N such that for each t ≥ T , if d < y ≤ b ≤ p−1, Uϕ(b|γ
t
h; vl)−Uϕ(d|γ
t
h; vl) > 0.
This implies that for each i ∈ N and {b, d} ⊆ {0, ..., p}, γtl (b) ≥ γ
t
l (d) if and only if
Uϕ(b|γ
t
h; vl) ≥ Uϕ(d|γ
th; vl). Thus, one can complete the proof as in Case 1.
Case 7: vl > 3vh/8, vl < 7vh/12−7/6, cl+1 < p = vl/2+(vh/2−vl/2)/5+4/5, pil = p,
pih = vh−p and ES(v) > 2. Let y ≡ cl−3(p−1−cl). Let n = p−1−y+1 = 4(p−1−cl)+1.
Since p− 1− cl ≥ 1, n ≥ 5. Direct calculation yields,
n = ch − p+ 1. (9)
Now, (ch − p)− y = 6((7vh/12− 7/6) − vl)/5 > 0. Since ch, p, and y are integers,
(ch − p)− y ≥ 1. (10)
Let σh ≡ δp and σl ≡ (1/n)
∑
y≤b≤p−1 δb. Clearly, for each p ≤ b < d, Uϕ(b|σl; vh) ≥
Uϕ(d|σl; vh) + 1. Clearly, for each d < y, Uϕ(y|σl; vh) > Uϕ(b|σl; vh). Let y ≤ d < p − 1.
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Then,
Uϕ(d+ 1|σl; vh)− Uϕ(d|σl; vh) = −(b− y)(1/n) + (1/n)(vh − (d+ 1)− ch)
+(1/n)(ch − (d+ 1))
= −(b− y + 2)/n + 2(ch − p+ 1)/n − 2/n
≥ 1− 2/n > 0.
Let r ∈ {p, ..., p} be the maximum for which Uϕ(r|σl; vh) ≥ Uϕ(y|σl; vh). Thus, for each
y ≤ b ≤ r and d > r, Uϕ(b|σl; vh) > Uϕ(d|σl; vh). Clearly, for each b < p < d, Uϕ(b|σh; vl) >
Uϕ(p|σh; vl) > Uϕ(d|σh; vl). Thus, there is ζ > 0 such that if ||γ − σ||∞ < ζ, then
(a) Uϕ(b|γl; vh) > Uϕ(d|γl; vh) whenever one of the following four conditions is satisfied
(i) p ≤ b < d; (ii) d < b = y; (iii) y ≤ d < p − 1 and b = d + 1; or (iv) y ≤ b ≤ r and
d > r.
(b) For each p < d, Uϕ(p|γl; vh) ≥ Uϕ(d|γl; vh) + 1/2.
(c) For each b < p < d, Uϕ(b|γh; vl) > Uϕ(p|γh; vl) > Uϕ(d|γh; vl).
Let κ > 0, ε > 0, η ≡ ε/2(r − y+ 2), τ ≡ (y +3/2)ε/n such that 2max{ε, τ} < ζ. For each
xh ∈ R
Mh and xl ∈ R
Mh , let
f ε,κh (xh) = (1− ε/2)δp + η
∑
y≤b≤r
δb + ηl
κ(x).
f ε,κl (xl) = (1/n − τ)

 ∑
y≤b≤p−1
δb

+ ε

 ∑
0≤b≤y−1
δb

+ εδp + (ε/2)lκ(x).
Let {κt}t∈N such that fore each t ∈ N, κt ∈ N; and as t→∞, κt →∞. Let {γ
t}t∈N be such
that for each t ∈ N, γt is a fixed point of the composition of (f ε,κth , f
ε,κt
l ) and the expected
payoff operator. Then, ||γt − σ||∞ < ζ. Thus, for each t ∈ N, γ
t satisfies (a)-(c) above.
Now,
Uϕ(p|γ
t
l ; vh)− Uϕ(p− 1|γ
t
l ; vh) =
∑
0≤b≤p−2 γ
t
l (b)(−1)
+γtl (p− 1)(vh − p− ch) + γ
t
l (p)(ch − p)
≥ −yε− (n− 1)(1/n − τ)
−ε/2 + (1/n − τ)(ch − p) + ε(ch − p)
= ε(ch − p− y − 1/2)
+(1/n − τ)(ch − p+ 1− n).
By (9) and (10), Uϕ(p|γ
t
l ; vh) − Uϕ(p − 1|γ
t
l ; vh) ≥ ε/2 > 0. Thus, for each t ∈ N and each
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{b, d} ⊆ {0, ..., p}, γth(b) ≥ γ
t
h(d) if and only if Uϕ(b|γ
t
l ; vh) − Uϕ(d|γ
t
l ; vh). Moreover, since
for each t ∈ N and each b 6= p, Uϕ(p|γ
t
l ; vh) ≥ Uϕ(p− 1|γ
t
l ; vh)+ε/2, we have that as t→∞,
γth → γh ≡ (1− ε/2 + η)δp + η
∑
y≤b≤r
δb.
The construction can be completed as in Case 6.
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